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This article reflects upon the gradual emergence of an Easterly shift of global power and 
its impact on Canada’s role in the international system. These transformative dynamics have 
resulted in new challenges for the Canadian government, which has been reviewing the orientation 
of its foreign policy agenda over the last two years. Burgeoning economic concerns have prompted 
Ottawa to mingle foreign policy with international trade. How can Canada’s role in an Eastphalian 
world be conceptualised? Through an initial review of the development of a distinctly Canadian 
approach to foreign policy and Canada’s reactions to pressing contemporary geopolitical 
challenges, this article seeks to conceptualise Canada’s place in an emergent Eastphalian world, 
through an appraisal of the strengths, weaknesses and lacunae of the Harper government’s on-going 
foreign policy approach.  
La géopolitique internationale reste profondément transformée par l’émergence des 
grandes superpuissances non-occidentales. Ce développement apporte de nouveaux défis au 
gouvernement fédéral canadien qui tente depuis la fin des années 2000 de restructurer les priorités 
de sa politique étrangère. Les questions relevant de l’économie nationale ont amené Ottawa à placer 
le commerce international au cœur de sa politique étrangère. Comment conceptualiser le rôle 
potentiel du Canada au sein d’un système international « estphalien » ? Après un bref rappel des 
traits marquants de la politique étrangère canadienneainsi que des politiques d’Ottawa envers 
quelques enjeux-clés contemporains, le présent article vise à mettre en lumière le rôle potentiel du 
Canada au sein d’un système international en transition, en évaluant les forces, les limites et les 
lacunes de la politique étrangère actuelle du gouvernement Harper.  
 
Canada’s Commonwealth stronghold?  
The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting took place in 
Colombo, Sri Lanka from 10 to 17 November 2013. The choice of Colombo as 
a venue has been a heatedly debated issue, due to widespread allegations over 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the prevalent situation of 
repression and violations of fundamental rights in Sri Lanka. Critics maintain 
that holding a CHOGM – the biannual summit of an international organisation 
prized for its discourse on human rights, the rule of law and accountability – in 
Colombo is synonymous with a tacit endorsement of a regime with little regard 
for the Commonwealth’s core values. Whereas the Conservative government in 
London approved the summit and confirmed its participation (Colombo 
Telegraph 2013), the Harper government in Ottawa upheld a resolute stance in 
opposing the choice of Colombo as a CHOGM venue, and consistent with its 
earlier Sri Lanka policy, maintained that its attendance shall depend upon 
Colombo’s progress in the area of Human Rights, minority rights and 
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accountability (CBC News, Apr. 25, 2013). On the same grounds, Ottawa 
finally decided to boycott the 2013 CHOGM. Similar opposition also came 
from New Delhi, but although Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh decided not 
to attend, a relatively high-profile delegation was sent to Colombo. The Harper 
government’s position on the Colombo CHOGM has been the subject of much 
debate (The Star, 13 August 2013, BRADY 2013), and it runs against the 
approaches pursued by key New Commonwealth member states including the 
UK and Australia, as well as the Commonwealth Secretary General’s 
endorsement of Sri Lanka as the 2013 CHOGM host.  
The Canadian government’s position on the Colombo CHOGM can be 
explained in two ways. Firstly, Canada is home to the world’s largest ethnic 
Tamil community outside South and Southeast Asia (BRADY 2013, see also 
AMARASINGAM 2013). The Canadian Tamil lobby has developed into an 
upwardly mobile, influential, politically active segment of Canadian society. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the debate surrounding Canada’s 
decision to boycott the Colombo CHOGM points at a much more complex 
contemporary dilemma in Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian government, 
especially through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
has long been a leading advocate of international development in many 
Commonwealth member states in the global South. As opposed to highly 
influential and “politically charged” world powers, Canada enjoys a reputation 
of exercising soft power and diplomatic leverage on the world stage, especially 
through her international development cooperation mechanisms.  
In a transforming international system marked by the rise of China and 
India, the dynamics of Canada’s role and capabilities as a leverage-wielding 
soft power have been put into question. This article attempts at conceptualising 
Canada’s position in an international system in which Western-led liberal 
peace-building initiatives (MACMILLAN 1998), benign intervention in conflict 
resolution, discourses on human rights and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
collide steadfastly with the principles that guide the foreign policies of 
emerging superpowers. A discussion of this nature imperatively revolves 
around Canada’s past and present position within the Commonwealth of 
Nations. Over the past few years, a substantial debate in the academic and 
policymaking circles as well as in think-tanks has sought to develop a 
revisionist and evaluative critique of Canadian foreign policy. A cursory glance 
at contributions made by practitioners and academics to Open Canada, the 
online platform of the Canadian International Council, suffices to take stock of 
the intensity of such debates. In a somewhat similar vein, the Commonwealth 
has taken steps to question its functional dynamics, and redefine its priorities. 
This trend is apparent in policy documents such as the Secretary General’s 
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reports, the output of the Eminent Persons’ Group, and in the Commonwealth 
strategic plan for 2013-2016 (see Commonwealth Secretary General 2011, 
BADAWI 2011, The Commonwealth 2013). Discussions on the role and 
relevance of the Commonwealth have also been developed by governmental 
bodies of member states (see notably House of Commons, UK, 2012). Focusing 
on Canada and her ties with the Commonwealth of Nations, it is to such debates 
that this article proposes to contribute, through an exploration of Canada’s 
evolving foreign policy priorities on a par with dominant trends in international 
affairs.  
 
The rise of « Eastphalia » and the emergence of a new international order 
In conceptualising the easterly shift in global strategic and economic 
influence, I shall use the typology of “Eastphalia”, i.e. the gradual emergence 
of a new world order in which the centre-point of world power witnesses an 
eastwardly shift.1 GINSBURG (2010) visualises Eastphalia as “the perfection of 
Westphalia”, that an emerging Eastphalian world order – with its emphasis on 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity of states and discouragement of 
external involvement in the internal affairs of fellow states – would in fact 
imply a return to the basics of the original Westphalian discourse of a 
community of states. Eastphalian priorities thus collide with Western liberal 
internationalist priorities of R2P and related discourses on human rights and 
accountability. How, and to what extent, have the aforementioned world 
developments affected Canada’s foreign policy orientation? How could one 
define Canada’s potential role in an international system that criss-crosses 
between Western liberal democratic normativity and supra-nationalism versus 
Eastphalian foreign and international development policies? Where does the 
Commonwealth stand in Canada’s present-day foreign policy priorities? 
Reflecting upon these lines, this article is structured in three main parts.  
Part one recapitulates the evolution of a distinctly Canadian foreign 
policy agenda. This section is intended to mirror the historical evolution of 
Canada’s foreign policy priorities, in the backdrop of which Ottawa’s present-
day foreign policy agenda is best ascertained. Part two focuses on the 
development of Canada’s partnerships with the global South, which initially 
began through the Commonwealth framework, and the subsequent emergence 
of Canada as a key partner in international development. Part three focuses on 
pressing contemporary foreign policy dilemmas, and seeks to outline strategies 
pursued by Ottawa in managing them. This discussion terminates with an 
                                                
1 See KIM (2009), FIDLER AND GANGULY (2010), LO (2010) and FIDLER (2010) 
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appraisal of the utility of the Commonwealth to contemporary Canadian foreign 
policy. This article highlights the reality that the role of Canada as a leading 
world power at the hour of Eastphalia is closely linked to her overall foreign 
policy legacy, as a government that strived for its own independent foreign 
policy and an equal footing on the world stage. It concludes that in asserting her 
due place in an Eastphalian world order, it is vital for Canada to develop an 
international agenda of her own, inverting tendencies to follow the scripts laid 
out by more influential superpowers.  
 
I: The development of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy: from side lines 
to the centre ground  
Until the 1940s, Canada had very tenuous relations with the non-western 
world, and Canada’s international perceptions were considerably conditioned 
by British policy. The British Empire and the Commonwealth constituted 
Canada’s principle channel of communication to the rest of the world 
(THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 77). The first territory to gain Dominion status 
in 1867, and consequently, near-complete control of her domestic affairs, 
Canada occupies a unique place in Commonwealth constitutional history (Ibid. 
79, BUCKNER 2008 : 66-86). As it will be evoked later in this article, Canada’s 
legacy as the first territory to acquire Dominion status subsequently prompted 
Ottawa to develop closer affinities with New Commonwealth countries, 
especially in the post-WWII era. This view of Canada as a precedent for self-
government has also been reciprocally affirmed in many a New 
Commonwealth polity. Despite its apparent salience, this perception is wanting 
in historical accuracy. As historian Ronald Hyam has highlighted, British 
Imperial policy was primarily based on geopolitical priorities. The granting of 
Dominion status to Canada, for instance, was largely motivated by geopolitical, 
economic and strategic concerns, as Canadian shipbuilding timber, the Halifax 
naval base, and a sizable merchant marine were strategic assets which the 
United States had to be denied. In some ways the new Canada represented a 
revamped imperial defence posture on the North American continent (HYAM 
1999: 33). In common with other early (Caucasian) Dominions (i.e. Australia in 
1901, New Zealand in 1907 and South Africa in 1910), the decision to grant 
self-government in internal affairs was, by and large, intended to sate the 
burgeoning nationalism of the white colonies while keeping them within an 
unaltered conception of empire (KRELING 2009 : 54-55). 
Whereas the Canadian government in Ottawa held power over domestic 
matters, article nine of the Constitution Act of 1867 reserved all executive 
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powers2, including foreign policy-related powers, to the British Crown 
(Government of Canada, 2012). This meant that Canada’s role in and 
interactions with the wider world were limited to matters of domestic concern 
such as trade, tariffs, fisheries and immigration. Foreign affairs and the powers 
related to war and peace continued to remain London’s exclusive preserve. 
Canada’s contacts with the world were channelled through London. The 
Colonial Conferences3 that began in 1887 facilitated interactions between 
Canadian legislators and policymakers in Britain and in other self-governing 
entities in the British Empire. From the 1880s, a Canadian High Commissioner 
was stationed in London and a Commissioner General’s office had been opened 
in Paris. These posts were devoid of diplomatic credentials, but served to 
interact with the British and French governments and with private citizens in 
matters such as immigration and trade. The concentration of executive powers 
in London meant that although the views of Dominions were not sought in 
making crucial decisions, the Dominions had no choice but to abide by 
London’s decisions (MACKENZIE 1999: 85). In 1914, for instance, Canada 
automatically entered WWI when Britain declared war on Germany (VEATCH 
1975: 3-5), a reality that – despite growing Canadian reluctance to follow the 
British lead on international affairs – was repeated in 1939 (Ibid: 82-83).  
The two World Wars had strongly transformative effects on the 
aforementioned mode of governance, facilitating Canada’s emergence as a 
leading world power. In the aftermath of WWI, Canada reinforced her position 
on the international scene as a member of the League of Nations, which, in 
theory, provided all its member states with the opportunity to take part in 
interactions on the full range of international problems of the day (VEATCH 
1975: 184, CHAPNICK 2005: 52-53). However, the League’s policies were 
largely dictated by the interests of the more influential world powers, and 
Canada’s mission to the Palais des Nations was involved in the task of 
promoting a fully independent status for herself internationally, a desire to 
minimize Canada’s commitments under the collective security system, and a 
Westphalian insistence that the League did not become involved in questions 
such as tariff and immigration policy, which the Canadian government viewed 
as purely domestic, internal matters (Ibid: 181). When Canada’s progresses 
                                                
2 The term “Constitution Act” has been used in Canadian government records since the Pierre 
Trudeau government’s patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982. The Act’s original name – 
the British North America Act – continues to appear on British government documentation (HART 
2008: 58).  
3 The Colonial Conferences were subsequently termed « Imperial Conferences » (for an extensive 
discussion on the role and impact of Imperial Conferences on governance in the British Empire, 
see, for example, KENDLE 1967).  
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during the League years are taken at face value, one could concur that Canada 
fared well in achieving the aforementioned goals.  
Over the first few decades of the 20th century, Canada was faced with 
the primary challenge of asserting herself as a government independent from 
British Imperial power. Efforts in this direction were constrained by Canada’s 
position as a Dominion state within the Commonwealth, and London’s strong 
influence within the Commonwealth as well as at the helm of world affairs. The 
terms of the Statute of Westminster of 1931, which was specifically intended to 
ensure the policymaking freedom of the dominions, did not include provisions 
for the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 
1976-1930. Canada’s foremost priority in foreign policy, to borrow from Allan 
Gotlieb (1991: 2), was that of emancipating herself from her subordinate 
imperial status. The course of Canada’s foreign policy from the 1920s to 1945 
was largely manoeuvred by one man, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie 
King. King and a number of his senior officials including, most notably, Dr 
Oscar D. Skelton, the Prime Minister’s closest advisor and Under-Secretary 
General of External Affairs, who is widely credited as the architect of Canadian 
foreign policy, were categorically opposed to Canadian participation in World 
War II. However, and despite this strong inclination to carve out a distinctly 
Canadian foreign policy agenda, Canada was bound by her own position as a 
Dominion within the Commonwealth, and by her special relationship with the 
United Kingdom, prompting Prime Minister King to approve Canada’s 
participation in WWII (VEATCH 1975: 184, GOTLIEB 1991: 2-3). The 
Commonwealth connection was multi-faceted. On the one hand, it represented 
the umbilical chord that linked Ottawa to London, a living reminder of the 
overarching power and influence of the British establishment on the first British 
territory to be granted Dominion status. The foremost challenge for the 
emergence of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy agenda was Ottawa’s 
tendency to align itself, in theory and in practice, with British policy 
(GRANATSTEIN 1970: 2).  
On the other hand, it was through Commonwealth-related legislative 
mechanisms and diplomatic ties that Canada found her path to develop as an 
independent power with her own distinct domestic and international agenda. As 
it will be outlined in Part two of this article, it was the Commonwealth that 
served as Ottawa’s primary channel to develop strong ties with the wider world. 
The core elements of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy, with its emphasis on 
development cooperation, peacekeeping assistance and most importantly, as a 
middle power with no colonial baggage that could interact with newly 
independent states in the non-Western world on an equal footing, were initially 
developed within the Commonwealth framework. Developing a distinctly 
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“Canadian” foreign policy agenda implied a search for common ground with 
fellow states in the Commonwealth community.  
 
Post-WWII: Canada’s pursuits on the supra-national platform   
To be Canadian in 1945 meant to be engaged in world affairs and actively 
concerned about the socio-economic state of less fortunate communities. 
Canadians wanted to help, to make a difference. But they also wanted these 
feelings to be noticed (…) they needed external affirmation that they were 
unique and exceptional (…) One might affirm that this desire for approval was 
just as Pearsonian as the idealism that accompanied it (…) however (…) the 
passion, and the national enthusiasm, the Canada that helped to create the United 
Nations were not Lester Pearson’s. It belonged to Mackenzie King (CHAPNICK 
2005 152).     
It was WWII that provided Canada with a tremendous opportunity to 
assert her position internationally, and gain fuller control of the executive 
powers, including the management of foreign policy. Canada’s wartime foreign 
policy was largely characterised by the overlapping of two conflicting 
approaches. The first was marked by caution and an inclination for non-
intervention, and the second called for a more forthright, interventionist and 
engaged international agenda. As early as 1943, Prime Minister King affirmed 
Canada’s potential of emerging as a “middle power”. His approach to foreign 
policy was marked by caution, and a preference for quiet diplomacy, which was 
strongly endorsed by his advisor Dr Oscar D. Skelton. As Chapnick (2005: 9-
10) notes, Skelton was highly influential in shaping Ottawa’s foreign policy 
until his sudden demise on 28 January 1941, paving the way for the prominence 
of advocates of a more internationalist and interventionist foreign policy, such 
as Lester Pearson, who was appointed as Assistant Under-Secretary General of 
External Affairs in the aftermath of Skelton’s demise. However, throughout 
Prime Minister King’s tenure, the priority was on the breaking up of Canada’s 
older tradition of following British policy, and developing a foreign policy 
agenda with a distinctly Canadian face.  
In early 1944, observing that the USA and the Soviet Union were bound 
to emerge as the foremost post-WWII world powers, the British sought to 
resurrect the old doctrine of British Imperial unity, with the objective of 
creating a stronger Commonwealth alliance. This view was most poignantly 
expressed – much to the outrage of Prime Minister King – in a speech delivered 
in Toronto by Lord Halifax, a politician with strong Imperialist credentials, ex-
Vice Roy in India, close confidante of Winston Churchill, and British 
ambassador in Washington DC, on 24 January 1944. In this speech, made on 
Canadian soil without any prior approval or clearance from Canadian 
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authorities, Halifax called for the creation of a centralised empire so that Britain 
could compete in a post-war world with what he termed the “titans”, i.e. Russia, 
China and the United States (MANSERGH 1953 : 576-9, MCKENZIE 2006 : 555). 
The political tide in Ottawa at the time, however, was all but favourable to a 
vision of that nature. By 1945, Canada under Prime Minister King was 
gradually moving on the path towards a foreign policy agenda of its own. The 
King government reinforced wartime defence cooperation with the United 
States, especially through the Ogdensburg Agreement of 17 August 1940 
between Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt.  
 
Canada and the United Nations: a conflicting narrative? 
The prioritisation of an Ottawa-based foreign policy agenda was further 
strengthened by Canada’s membership of the United Nations (UN). Opinion on 
the Canadian contribution to the founding of the UN is marked by two 
conflicting narratives. Whereas one takes pride in Canada’s growing position as 
a significant player on the international scene, the other is more sceptical of 
such successes, and calls for an appraisal of Canada’s limits in international 
diplomacy. The former opinion came to be known as “Pearsonian 
internationalism”. In the post-WWII years, Canada’s role in the international 
scene was considerably characterised by the role of Lester Pearson, who had 
emerged to higher government office, first as Secretary of State for External 
Affairs in 1948 and subsequently as Prime Minister in 1963. Pearson’s 
internationalism was strongly demonstrated in Canada’s contributions to create 
a system of UN-mandated peacekeeping operations (see Carroll 2009). The first 
significant test of Canada’s facilitative role in developing peacekeeping 
operations was the Suez crisis of 1956. On 2 November 1956, Pearson 
abstained from voting a UN resolution on the Suez issue, citing the absence of 
provisions for what he described as: 
A United Nations force large enough to keep these borders [of Egypt and Israel] 
at peace while a political settlement is being worked out (…) My own 
government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a 
United Nations force, a truly international police and peace force. (PEARSON 
1957: 8-11, reproduced in GRANATSTEIN 1970: 84).  
Pearson’s contribution to UN peacekeeping in the Suez won him the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, providing Canada a highly publicised international 
standing as a promoter of world peace. In one of the most comprehensive 
analyses of Canada’s role vis-à-vis the UN’s genesis, Chapnick (2005) 
challenges the received wisdom of Canada’s pioneering role in establishing the 
UN. At the San Francisco conference of the United Nations on International 
Organisation in June 1945, Canada did make a significant contribution to the 
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founding of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), whereas its efforts 
to find its due place in the Security Council through the functional principle 
proved to be a failure. Security happened to be the great powers’ reserved 
realm (ibid :126). In the course of the San Francisco deliberations of 1945, 
Canada under Prime Minister King chose prudence over popularity, concluding 
that a stable, economically and socially integrated world order was more 
valuable than international recognition as the leader of the so-called middle 
powers (ibid : 138).  
However, mediatisation of Canada’s international role during this period 
was such that a somewhat contrasting memory was left with the Canadian 
public psyche, which led to the notion that Canada had become the 
international community’s helpful fixer. Despite Canada’s failure in emerging 
as a “middle power” at the inception of the modern UN in 1945, it is vital to 
highlight that the notion of a “middle power”, i.e. a Western state that shares 
neither a superpower status nor a historical legacy of colonisation, is of vital 
relevance to Canada’s present-day international role. Canada’s present-day 
international reputation considerably rests on the “helpful fixer” and “middle 
power” typologies, and as it will be highlighted later in this article, exploiting 
this reputation to the benefit of the country can be seen as Canada’s foremost 
contemporary foreign policy challenge. 
 
Canada as a non-decisive power: A Commonwealth consequence?  
In Ottawa’s efforts to develop a distinctly Canadian foreign policy, its 
historical legacy of British rule and position as a Dominion within the 
Commonwealth formed a barrier on the path to gain due acceptance outside the 
Commonwealth as a full-fledged, independent government. This was 
particularly the case with Canada’s interactions with the United States. 
Concerning North Atlantic political cooperation in the early years of WWII, for 
instance, the U.S. government preferred direct interactions with London, 
thereby effectively relegating Canada to a position of secondary importance. 
When President Roosevelt met Prime Minister Churchill for secret talks on 
post-war cooperation on 9 August 1941 (on board a battleship off Argentia 
harbour in Newfoundland) Prime Minister King was kept uninformed, due to 
the U.S. assertion that Canada had no place in bilateral discussions between 
two world powers (CHAPNICK 2005: 16). Whereas Canada’s contribution to 
WWII was substantial, Canada continued to face challenges in emerging as a 
key player in international security. In her quest to be part of the key global 
decision-makers in this domain, Canada sought to reinforce her role on the 
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security front by actively engaging in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and, as highlighted above, in UN peacekeeping missions.  
 
NATO: exit strategy from subordinate status on the world stage? 
The break-up of the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the 
Western allies, and the resulting tension between the Western and Soviet blocks 
posed major problems for the UN to function independently. The emergence of 
the Cold War required an emphasis on regional collective security, leading the 
way to NATO, in the founding of which Canada played a significant role 
(LAWLESS 2006). Lester Pearson, together with like-minded counterparts in the 
United States such as Dean Acheson, the Truman administration’s Secretary of 
State, actively prioritised NATO. The importance Canada accorded to NATO 
prompted Pierre Trudeau to observe on his election as Prime Minister in 1968 
that in the preceding years, Canada had no significant defence or foreign policy 
apart from NATO (ENGLER 2012). Whereas some analysts perceive Canada’s 
contributions to NATO and NATO’s impact on Canada in a positive light 
(SAIDEMAN 2012), others, such as Granatstein (2013) call for a reassessment of 
NATO’s contemporary relevance to Canada, calling for a shift of focus from 
NATO to exclusive defence partnerships with the United States. It is scarcely 
acknowledged that for Ottawa, engagement with NATO (as well as with UN 
peacekeeping measures) provided an opportunity of inverting its above-
mentioned position of subordination in the international community. NATO 
provided the Commonwealth Dominion with a unique opportunity of 
interacting with the U.S. and UK governments on a relatively equal footing. 
Contrary to Prime Minister King’s absence in the Roosevelt-Churchill secret 
meeting of 1941, Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson was 
present in secret talks held between the UK and USA in March 1948, on the 
possibility of creating a North Atlantic alliance (ENGLER 2012).  
 
Governance and realpolitik: Canada’s early experiences of national 
security dilemmas 
Canada’s dominant politico-historical narrative is marked by a general 
picture of gaining full control over the hitherto “reserved” prerogatives and 
moving on to propagate fundamental rights and peacekeeping across the world. 
This reading, however, lacks in critical insights into aspects of Canadian policy 
orientation during the post-WWII period. Contrary to popular belief, Canada’s 
encounters with counterterrorism can be traced back decades before 9/11 and 
the infamous Maher Arar case (ABU-LABAN and NATH 2007, WHITAKER 2010: 
57), to the turbulent immediate aftermath of WWII. The discovery of a 
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Russian-run spy-ring on Canadian soil in 1946 – better known as the Gouzenko 
Affair – prompted Ottawa to adopt a highly repressive process of control, 
infringing fundamental rights and civil liberties (WHITAKER 2010: 37-44, 
CLÉMENT 2012: 756-757). Ottawa’s approach to this issue was at the heart of 
the Canadian government’s initial reluctance to extend its support to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Canada’s subsequent 
vote in favour of UDHR was largely the result of pressure on Ottawa from 
within and without, as well as her unwillingness to side with the likes of the 
Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, the UDHR’s most fervent 
opponents (CLÉMENT 2012: 755-757). The Canadian government explained its 
anti-UDHR stance on the basis of the principle of parliamentary supremacy, 
deeply entrenched in Canada's political and legal culture. The courts of justice 
never challenged, for example, the federal cabinet's prerogative to suspend due 
process and indefinitely detain and interrogate suspected Russian spies in 1946 
(ibid. :757-758). It is a significant irony of world affairs that Canada, a Western 
state to adapt an incongruous and questionable stance on the UDHR back in 
1948, subsequently emerged – as her opposition to the 2013 Colombo CHOGM 
implies – an ardent advocate of human rights and civil liberties.4 The crucial 
underlying reality is that at different junctures of history, important policy 
decisions have been taken on the basis of quintessential realpolitik and the 
political interests of the governments in power. Hans Morgenthau’s infamous 
observation that political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, 
or to demonstrate power is of special relevance to the entirety of Canada’s 
foreign policy trajectory (MORGENTHAU 1948: 21-22). By no means is this a 
feature unique to the Canadian establishment alone. It is deemed worthy of 
reiteration in the present reflection due to its significance to a discussion on the 
present-day challenges facing Canadian foreign policy, including Canada’s 
position within the Commonwealth of Nations.  
 
II: Canada and the developing world: a foreign policy focal point?  
Canada in the Commonwealth: early interactions and reputation-building 
Over the post-WWII years, the Canadian government strove to develop 
an international image as a nation that identified itself with the political 
aspirations of fellow Commonwealth member states beyond the Western 
hemisphere (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 80-81). The Commonwealth 
framework was crucial in facilitating Canada’s links with emerging New 
                                                
4 Canada plays a vital role in human rights advocacy at transnational level, especially through the 
Canadian Human Rights Council’s efforts to support human rights commissions in other countries, 
both multilaterally and bilaterally (see most notably, CARDENAS 2003: 783).  
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Commonwealth nations including India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana and Nigeria 
(ibid.: 77).  
Canada’s lobbying was instrumental in facilitating the integration of the 
Republic of India into the Commonwealth of Nations, which set in place a 
trend that Pakistan and Ceylon also followed. As the independence of India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon was being negotiated in the mid/late 1940s, the “Canadian 
view”, i.e. the original admixture of unfettered sovereignty and close 
cooperation within the Commonwealth, had acquired a position of crucial 
importance. The Canadian contribution to the 1949 London Conference of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, which ensured the inclusion of the Republic 
of India in the Commonwealth and turned a new page in the organisation’s 
evolution, is well-documented (MACKENZIE 1999). Prime Ministers Mackenzie 
King and St Laurent were particularly keen to seek a formula that would 
reconcile Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s firm commitment to making India 
a republic, while remaining within the Commonwealth. This objective was 
ultimately achieved by incorporating the words “Head of the Commonwealth” 
to the British sovereign’s title, enabling some member states to recognise the 
British monarch only in that non-binding capacity (THOMSON AND SWANSON 
1971: 79-80).  
Canada’s own experience as a nation that saw the world through “British 
eyes” and subsequently emerged as an independent power had a strong appeal 
on leaders of New Commonwealth countries. Yet, Canada’s efforts to develop 
the profile of a Western partner that acutely shared the politico-historical 
challenges of New Commonwealth states were oftentimes marred by practical 
hurdles. Such constraints were considerably apparent, for example, in Canada’s 
relations with India. The Canadian government was keen to develop an Indo-
Canadian entente, a partnership that both parties cherished. However, Ottawa 
found it challenging to maintain a smooth relationship with Nehru and the 
Indian government during the 1950s and 60s, especially under the premiership 
of John Diefenbaker. Delhi’s subsequent adherence to a foreign policy based on 
non-alignment caused further concern in Ottawa. Senior government officials 
found Indian leaders (especially Nehru) rather unfathomable, mainly due to 
their inclination to juxtapose highly anglophile lifestyles and (in many cases) 
Oxbridge backgrounds with strong discourses of Indian nationalism, anti-
colonialism and a foreign policy emphasis on non-alignment. Under the 
Diefenbaker premiership, such rifts with Indian leaders resulted in a 
rapprochement of Canadian leaders with their Pakistani counterparts (TOUHEY 
2011 : 430-431).  
As a Commonwealth Dominion, Canada’s position on the world stage 
was not favourable to adopt a robust foreign policy agenda. In 1950, for 
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example, Prime Minister Nehru made a persuasive speech at the first summit of 
the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and 
Southeast Asia, held in Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950, calling for the early 
recognition of the newly-formed Communist government of mainland China, 
highlighting the potential dangers of isolating China from the world 
community. Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson expressed 
full agreement with Nehru’s views, and so did Prime Minister Louis St Laurent. 
Yet, Ottawa was not in a position to take action due to pressure from 
Washington DC and Québec-related concerns. The outbreak of the Korean War 
further tied Canada’s hands in this regard (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 80-
81). Geopolitical hurdles took some twenty more years for Canada to establish 
diplomatic relations with china in 1970, as China began to reach out for greater 
international contact and support in the face of growing power and pressure of 
the Soviet Union at the time (STUTTER 2012 336).  
 
Development assistance: key component in Canada’s international agenda 
Canada has long enjoyed a strong reputation as a leading provider of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), which, at the outset, was focused on 
the Commonwealth of Nations. After the election of Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker in 1957, it was staunchly maintained that development assistance 
was crucial to stave off economic offensives launched from Moscow and 
Peking (TOUHEY 2011: 431-432).5 The dissemination of Canadian aid in South 
and Southeast Asia was largely carried out within the Commonwealth 
framework, through the Colombo Plan (ibid.). The significance of this role 
dates back to the early 1950s, when the Canadian government agreed to 
contribute some 25 million CAD per annum to the Colombo Plan at the latter’s 
first international conference (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 80). Within the 
Colombo Plan, Canada contributed a staggering billion dollars in assistance 
from 1950 to 1969, more than two-thirds of which went to India, and the rest to 
Pakistan and Ceylon (ibid. : 81). The role of a generous donor for international 
development began to characterise Canadian foreign policy and international 
presence in the developing world. Over the 1950s and 1960s, Canada 
contributed some two billion CAD for international development. This, 
however, does not imply that prioritising international aid did not trigger 
controversy. A Gallup poll conducted in 1968 revealed, for example, that two-
                                                
5 There is a broad literature on the motives of Canadian aid policy, which has been traditionally 
ascribed to a mixture of three motivations, philanthropic, economic and political. For an early 
discussion of these motives and the predominance of political interests in development policy, see 
Triantis 1971. For a revisionist reading of these three motives, see NOSSAL 1988).  
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thirds of Canadians expressed opposition to increases in income taxes to help 
developing countries. Canada’s success in managing such challenges lay in the 
ability of a small number of influential politicians such as Lester Pearson to 
appeal to the “idealism of a nation making its first steps on the international 
stage” (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 93-94, TRIANTIS 1971).  
Domestic political contentions emanating from Québecois nationalism 
and language politics had a strong impact on the expansion of Canadian 
development assistance to the French-speaking world. As more and more 
French colonies in the African continent gained independence, Québec’s 
nationalist lobbies were increasingly conscious of extending support to their 
francophone counterparts in Africa. In 1961 such pressures prompted Prime 
Minister John Diefenbaker to allocate some 300,000 CAD as development aid 
to francophone African countries (ibid : 84). Québec expressed a willingness to 
extend its highly politicised claim to deal directly with France without passing 
through Ottawa to the rest of the French-speaking world, prompting the federal 
government to take further action. In 1967-68, for instance, Ottawa sent a high-
level mission to Africa, which identified a range of projects that would receive 
Canadian support, and by 1973, development aid to Africa rose to some 100 
million CAD. This made the division of development aid between English and 
French-speaking countries roughly proportionate to the size of the two 
linguistic groups within Canada’s national borders (ibid : 85).   
In the early years of Canada’s role as an international donor, aid 
distribution was relatively straightforward, with the emphasis on countries in 
need. This was subsequently replaced by a focus on capacity building, in which 
the CIDA provided financial assistance to government departments in recipient 
countries, which would enable local officials to develop experience in 
administering their own development and poverty alleviation initiatives. 
Concerns over the misappropriation of funds and corrupt practices put an end to 
aid for capacity building, paving the path to a juxtaposition of trade and aid, 
with aid poured into countries with trade potential for Canada (YORK 2013). 
Canadian aid largely flows to countries of focus (The National Post, 11 Jan. 
2013), which alter in accordance with Canada’s foreign policy and multilateral 
priorities. The Harper government has particularly prioritised drastic cuts in 
foreign aid, a policy that has earned it much criticism. It has considerably 
reduced aid allocations to Africa, and a recently updated list of priorities 
contains twenty countries and regions, but excludes countries such as Rwanda, 
still rising from the tragedy of genocide, Niger, where government struggles 
against Islamist militants who kidnapped two Canadian diplomats in December 
2008, and Burkina Faso, whose leaders assisted in the negotiations to release 
the diplomats in late April 2009 (YORK 2009).   
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At the heart of this gradual policy transformation is the Harper 
government’s resolve to firmly incorporate foreign aid with international trade. 
Whereas aid to the poorest nations has witnessed cuts, aid allocations have been 
increased for middle-income countries where Canada has business and 
geopolitical interests. In a somewhat intriguing development, the Harper 
government has been altering its Africa policy since 2011, in an effort to 
interact with emerging African markets (HORNSBY 2013). The present-day 
emphasis is on applying the aforementioned trade/aid binary focus to selected 
African destinations. As a short press release on a meeting between Prime 
Minister Harper and his Senegalese counterpart Macky Sall during the 2013 
UN General Assembly outlines, Canada’s relations with Senegal largely 
revolve around trade interests, which notably involve Canadian investments in 
Senegal’s mining industry (Office of the Prime Minister, 2013, HORNSBY 
2013). This policy orientation was further cemented by the March 2013 merger 
of CIDA with the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, a 
decision that has been questioned for its inability to resolve fundamental 
questions of policy consistency, and to develop a long-term, sustainable 
strategy for international development (PARIS 2013). The present-day priorities 
of Canada’s international aid policy are succinctly summed up in a May 2013 
research report produced by the North South Institute, which avers that: 
An overarching policy framework for Canada’s engagement with the 
developing world is needed. The key components needed in this framework are 
the rationale and vision for Canada’s aid and engagement with the developing 
world, clarification on the role of different policies and partners, and guidance 
for the Canadian government as a whole. Such a framework could provide an 
effective way for Canada to demonstrate its commitment to global development 
and provide a basis for its relationships with developing countries (BÜLLES AND 
KINDORNAY 2013: 35).  
  
III: Commonwealth side-lined? Neoliberal priorities and contemporary 
Canadian foreign policy  
In examining Canada’s international role in an Eastphalian world, the 
following discussion lays emphasis on two vital aspects, Canada’s relationship 
with the United States and the growing partnership with China. An exploration 
of key aspects of U.S.-Canada and China-Canada relations is complemented by 
a discussion of the Harper government’s foreign policy priorities, which have 
caused much debate. Parts One and Two of this article served to highlight the 
significant role of the Commonwealth framework in the development of 
Canadian foreign and international development aid policies. In comparison, 
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the Commonwealth occupies a subordinate position in the following discussion, 
which is considerably suggestive of Canada’s contemporary foreign policy 
preoccupations. Whereas the Commonwealth of Nations no longer plays a 
decisive role in shaping Canadian foreign policy, it is highlighted that the 
organisation’s salience to Canadian governance in general and foreign policy in 
particular continues to remain a reality that could be exploited to Ottawa’s 
advantage.  
 
Canada and the United States: a vital partnership of imbalance?  
It would be a mistake to indulge the fantasy that Canada will ever preoccupy the 
U.S. to the same degree that the U.S. preoccupies Canada. We need to move 
beyond such conceits, stop the misdirected blame game, and get on with 
business. (PARIS, 29 June 2012) 
An effort to explore Canada’s international role in the context of 
emergent Eastphalian power dynamics would be incomplete in the absence of 
an appraisal of decisive contemporary challenges to Canadian foreign policy, 
and Canada’s track record of addressing them. Ottawa’s close partnership with 
Washington DC has been interpreted as the “bedrock” of Canadian foreign 
policy (PARIS 2012). This relationship has been constrained by the power 
imbalance between Ottawa and Washington DC, and it has often appeared, to 
the dismay of many Canadians, that Washington DC was instrumental in 
defining the orientation of Canadian foreign policy. The view that Canadian 
economic policy orientation is near-exclusively directed by the United States 
has long dominated international attitudes towards Canada. In 1975, for 
instance, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of France opposed Canada’s entry 
into the Group of Seven industrialised countries (G7), on the grounds that 
Canada was an economic appendage of the United States and that, 
consequently, a separate representation was unwarranted (NOSSAL 1997: 197, 
MASSIE 2008: 87).  
Debates on the U.S predominance of Canadian affairs have continued to 
characterise Canada-USA relations in the post-9/11 era. The effects of 9/11 on 
Canada’s foreign policy orientation have received much academic attention 
(ROACH 2003, 2011, WHITAKER 2010). Canada’s reaction to the 9/11 attacks 
was two-fold. Firstly, Ottawa immediately responded to UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 with the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 that contained a broad 
definition of terrorism, tougher immigration and asylum controls and reinforced 
security on the US border. These measures were complemented by the 
deployment of a military contingent in southern Afghanistan, in direct 
confrontation with Taliban and Al-Qaida guerrillas. Canadian military presence 
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in Afghanistan has been stepped up under the Harper government (WHITAKER 
2010: 48).  
The second tier of Canadian action involved a comparatively less 
publicized venture that revolved around the maintenance of security on the 
open land border with the USA. The position of the USA as Canada’s powerful 
immediate neighbour as well as key partner on the international scene is 
complemented by the USA’s significance to Canada in terms of external trade. 
The USA is the primary trading partner for most Canadian provinces 
(KUKUCHA 2008 19). In this backdrop, border security constituted the centre 
point of Canadian security policy in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 
(WHITAKER 2010: 50, ROACH 2011: 424).  The Canadian trade establishment 
unequivocally called for the reopening of the U.S. border for unimpeded 
commerce at whatever political cost. This was a crucial priority for Canadian 
businesses. The economic costs of a protected U.S. border were unacceptable to 
Canada, which sends more than 85 per cent of its exports to the United States. 
Consequently, Ottawa was faced with a double-edged sword. If it were to 
ensure an open U.S. border, it had to comply by the U.S.-led dictates of a North 
American security perimeter in which Canadian sovereignty would be seriously 
threatened by pressures to “harmonize” Canadian laws and practices along U.S. 
standards. Ottawa was faced with the challenge of reassuring the United States 
sufficiently on border security so that commercial traffic can be maintained, 
while not surrendering a critical degree of Canadian sovereignty in the process 
(WHITAKER 2010: 50).  
Canada’s cooperation with the USA on the diplomatic front witnessed a 
setback when Ottawa refused to partake in the Bush administration’s war in 
Iraq. The Iraq war cut a wedge between the two countries rather than deepening 
the closeness that has historically characterized the continent with the “world’s 
longest undefended border” (ibid : 49). Although Canadians sympathized with 
Americans in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration’s 
subsequent tendency to pursue an aggressive “America First” course of action 
put severe strains on a Western alliance that had remained relatively cohesive 
throughout the Cold War (ibid). Similar to Washington DC’s post-Iraq aversion 
of the Jacques Chirac administration in Paris, the Liberal governments of Jean 
Chrétien and Paul Martin were perceived in Washington DC as “anti-
American”, and the Conservatives under Stephen Harper as more favourably 
inclined to the Bush administration. In the Obama era, the Harper government 
has undertaken painstaking efforts to be seen as following the lead of President 
Obama’s popular Democratic administration. Despite this political strategy, the 
Harper government is ideologically not on the same page as its American 
counterpart (ibid).  
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Between a “big” neighbour, new horizons and the reputation of a “middle 
power”: Canada at crossroads 
In announcing his Cabinet on 6 February 2006, and following a long-
standing tradition, Prime Minister Harper also established a Cabinet committee 
on foreign affairs. This was accompanied by the reintegration of the portfolios 
of external affairs, trade and development into a single unit (HART 2008 : 66). 
This decision mirrored the Harper government’s subsequent orientation on 
foreign policy priorities. It launched an internal foreign policy overhaul in 
2011, which was accelerated after the appointment of Foreign Minister John 
Baird in May 2011. This initiative, named Foreign Policy Plan (FPP), was 
intended at redefining Canada’s foreign policy priorities, especially with 
regards to emerging markets in Asia, and in addressing concerns related to 
trade cooperation with state-owned Chinese firms, which risks enabling 
China’s strategic and national interests play a role in international business 
(CTV News, 17 Nov. 2011). The overall orientation of this foreign policy 
agenda could be glimpsed in the draft of a classified new “Canadian Foreign 
Policy Plan” dated September 6, 2012, and leaked to the press in November 
2012 (CBC News, 19 Nov. 2012). This document unambiguously maintained 
that: 
The situation is stark: Canada's trade and investment relations with new 
economies, leading with Asia, must deepen, and as a country we must become 
more relevant to our new partners (…) To succeed we will need to pursue 
political relationships in tandem with economic interests even where political 
interests or values may not align (Ibid.). 
This line of thinking was further entrenched into the Harper 
government’s foreign policy through the Global Markets Action Plan of 2013, 
which outlined Ottawa’s priorities in international trade (Government of 
Canada, 2013). An underlying aspect of this document is its firm juxtaposition 
of international trade policy with foreign policy. As Paris (2013) outlines, 
Ottawa’s primary strategy of promoting Canadian commercial interests in 
foreign markets risks looming over the rest of Canada’s foreign policy. In an 
era of international trade marked by Western states near-unanimously adopting 
“look East” policies, Canada’s shift to Asia, as well as Africa and South 
America does not come as a surprise. However, the reason that prompted the 
Canadian government to keep the key document detailing its new foreign 
policy agenda classified, was the slowness with which Canada has been making 
her “look-East” transition, and a potential public backlash against Ottawa’s 
objective of seeking close trade-related cooperation with ideologically opposed 
countries. Trade relations with China, for instance, have been particularly 
strengthened in the late 2000s, with the signing of the Foreign Investment 
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Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPPA) with China, which Duc (2012) 
describes as the punctuation mark at the end of a declaration, which denotes 
that Canada is ready and willing to do business with China. 
 
On Canada’s new international priorities at the hour of Eastphalia?  
China’s rapid economic development required more foreign trade, 
involving increasing imports of energy, foods, and other resources, which 
Canada willingly provided. Chinese exports of manufactured goods to Canada 
grew enormously, leading to a large trade deficit for Canada, estimated at over 
half the value of total trade (STUTTER 2012, 336). Over the 2000s, China’s role 
in Canada’s economic life has gained unprecedented relevance and influence. 
China has heavily invested in Canada’s natural resources. Some critics of the 
Harper government’s decision to boycott the 2013 Colombo CHOGM cited the 
case of China’s human rights record and especially the Chinese government’s 
approach to Tibet, on which the Canadian government adopts a much more 
diplomatic posture. This critique maintained that Sri Lanka’s comparative lack 
of diplomatic and economic leverage on the international scene enabled the 
Harper government to adopt a stern policy on not-so-influential Sri Lanka and 
turn a blind eye to identical concerns in decisively influential China. Despite 
the salience of this argument, Canada’s relations with China have not always 
been devoted to economic cooperation and a disregard for China’s human 
rights situation. In the early years of the Harper government, Ottawa did take a 
stern stance on China’s human rights issues (STUTTER 2012: 336).  
In the present-day context, Canada’s foremost priority in terms of her 
relations with China and the rest of Southeast Asia involves extensive 
economic cooperation that builds upon existing partnerships, which Prime 
Minister Harper describes as moving Canada-China relations to the “next level” 
(CBC News, 10 Feb. 2012). This notably involves new accords on energy-
related cooperation and an overall effort to diversify the Canadian export 
market, which has been largely focused on the U.S. market (Government of 
Canada, 14 Mar. 2013).6 China already plays an active role in the Canadian oil 
industry; in October 2011, Sinopec acquired Canadian oil and gas producer 
Daylight Energy Ltd. for CAD 2.2 billion, a year after it invested CAD 4.65 
billion in an Alberta oil-sands project, China’s largest-ever investment in North 
America (Huffington Post, 16 Nov. 2011). A not insignificant juncture of this 
                                                
6 In terms of petroleum, to quote Minister of International Trade Ed Fast, Canada is the “largest oil 
supplier to the United States”. In 2011, Canada delivered 2.8 million barrels a day of crude oil and 
refined products—more than Saudi Arabia and Venezuela combined (Government of Canada, 14 
Mar. 2013). 
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partnership was Ottawa’s increased emphasis on trade partnerships with China, 
notably in relation to oil, in the aftermath of the U.S. federal government’s 
decision to postpone the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, in the face 
of large-scale protests in front of the White House on 6 November 2011. The 
pipeline was meant to transport some 700,000 barrels of Albertan oil to 
refineries in the U.S. Gulf Coast, generating thousands of jobs (BURNEY AND 
HAMPSON 2012). Soon after the U.S. decision to postpone the project, the 
Canadian government emphasised its prioritisation of trade with East Asia and 
especially, China. Prime Minister Harper directly clarified this stance to 
President Obama, and days after the U.S. postponement, Canadian Finance 
Minister Jim Flaherty visited China, reiterating Canada’s commitment to trade 
ties and seeking opportunities to strengthen cooperation with regards to oil 
exportations (CTV News, 14 Nov. 2011). Despite these forward steps, the U.S. 
market continues to remain Canada’s foremost destination for oil exports. 
Whereas the Keystone issue -- due to the opposition not only from 
environmental activists but also rail transportation firms – has been highly 
mediatised with some observers, also noting that the Keystone project risks 
being hampered by the latent surge of U.S. oil output (CBC News, 28 Nov. 
2013), the US market is set to be open for Canadian oil exports for the 
foreseeable future. Alberta is not the only Canadian state to export oil to the 
USA and Newfoundland, for instance, has been continuing its exports to the 
USA while maintaining a low media profile.  
 
“We know where our interests lie”: on Canada’s international role at the 
hour of Eastphalia 
Challenges of Eastphalia and problems of consistency  
Commenting in 2011 on the Harper government’s defeat (to Portugal) in 
the contest to gain a temporary seat at the UN Security Council, one observer 
attributes Canada’s defeat to what she describes as “the Harper government’s 
enduring lack of sophistication in international affairs” (GAGNON, 2011). The 
Harper foreign policy orientation since 2006 has witnessed a rather abrupt 
series of fluctuations, such as curtly halting aid programmes and diplomatic 
representations and the tendency to redirect Canadian focus from 
Commonwealth-linked efforts in Africa towards projects in Latin America in 
the late 2000s (KRELING 2009 : 52, SIDDIQUI 2012). As highlighted above, this 
inconsistency is also apparent in the Harper government’s critical stance on 
China’s human rights situation at the beginning of its first term of office, and 
the subsequent “un-doing” of all such critiques, adapting a discourse of 
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reinforced trade cooperation with China.7 Canada’s overall present-day foreign 
policy, as highlighted in the previous section, is closely linked to international 
trade, and the promotion of Canadian businesses abroad. This approach, in the 
context of global economic woes, low growth in Canada’s traditional exports in 
the West and the rapid rise of non-Western (especially Southeast Asian) 
markets, is an advisable policy. However, it also raises concerns over its impact 
on Canada’s overall foreign policy. It is deeply entrenched in the neoliberal 
drift in contemporary world politics. Concerning Africa, for instance, the 
Canadian government is focused on its trade interests at the expense of longer-
term sustainable development goals, a policy that has been criticised as short-
sighted and strategically unsustainable (PEARSON 2011, GOLDFARB 2013). 
While analysts calls for a more consistent, involved and nuanced Africa policy 
(HORNSBY 2013), African diplomats have reiterated the necessity of increased 
political and diplomatic partnerships with Canada (CLARK 2012).  
A foreign policy agenda with a distinctly “Canadian” emphasis on 
multilateralism, peacekeeping, the promotion of liberal democratic values and 
most importantly, as a middle power constitutes, by and large, Canada’s 
foremost contribution to the international system. In the contemporary political 
zeitgeist, Canada possesses substantive potential in playing a vital role as a 
middle power. In the context of post-9/11 emphasis on counterterrorism, the 
increased leverage of emerging Eastphalian superpowers, as well as the 
neoliberal drift in world politics, Canadian foreign policy faces new challenges, 
especially vis-à-vis the global South. Rapidly increasing Chinese influence in 
Asia and Africa is largely facilitated by the China’s “Eastphalian” foreign 
policy priority of non-involvement in the internal affairs of fellow states. In this 
context, many governments in the global South with dubious human rights 
records and reputations for repression have been developing closer ties with 
Peking, and are less inclined to abide by Western liberal internationalist 
dictates. The leverage wielded by Western development assistance and 
financial support has thus witnessed a considerable Eastphalian challenge 
throughout the global South.  
 
Canada and today’s Commonwealth: a new international agenda for 
Ottawa?  
The corollary to the aforementioned prospects is the fact that Canada, 
despite her long struggle to wield autonomy in managing her international 
affairs, has often tended to follow the scripts laid down by Western 
                                                
7At the inception of the Harper government (and to China’s outrage), it conferred honorary 
Canadian citizenship on the Dalai Lama in September 2006 (CBC News, March 8, 2012).  
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superpowers. The latest foreign policy focus on trade and investments in Asia 
and Africa, and a lesser emphasis on human rights and accountability, leaves 
one somewhat bemused concerning Canada’s foreign policy priorities. The 
realist rationale that guides Ottawa maintains that strong emphasis on 
fundamental rights and accountability in political contexts where Canada has 
substantive trade dividends is all but counterproductive. Despite the dominance 
of this discourse, recent developments such as Ottawa’s boycott of the 
Colombo CHOGM demonstrate that the Harper government is not completely 
oblivious to the cons of this new foreign policy emphasis. As reiterated earlier 
in this article, the Harper government’s foreign policy emphasis (of lack 
thereof) on issues of governance and accountability is determined by the 
constraints of trade dividends. It is within this narrow framework of realpolitik 
that Ottawa is disposed to uphold the Commonwealth’s core values of respect 
for human rights, the rule of law and accountability. Canada’s role within the 
Commonwealth of Nations is thus shaped by more pressing priorities including, 
most importantly, decisive trade partnerships. Despite this reality, the 
Commonwealth continues to play a non-negligible role in Canadian 
governance. Ottawa has taken steps towards reinforcing Canada’s presence in 
the Commonwealth through generous financial allocations as well as gestures 
of commitment including the appointment of a special envoy to the 
Commonwealth (Government of Canada, Oct. 23, 2013), not to mention CAD 
7.5 million spent on the Queen’s golden jubilee celebrations in 2012 (Ibid). 
However, such commitments no longer imply a central role to the 
Commonwealth of Nations in Canadian foreign policy. Changing priorities 
have relegated the Commonwealth to a ceremonial, omnipresent yet near-
unarguably insignificant position in Canadian foreign policy.  
A vital factor that requires reiteration is that in order to exploit Canada’s 
potential within the Commonwealth, it is necessary for Ottawa to emerge as a 
power with an international agenda of its own, with little trace of an inclination 
to follow the scripts laid down by more influential world powers. Canada’s 
tremendous human resource potential and image of a middle power on the 
international scene are of vital importance in reaping the best out of its position 
as a leading member of the Commonwealth. As an international body based on 
voluntary association, the Commonwealth has entered a new era of enhanced 
supra-national interaction across linguistic and politico-historical boundaries. 
This trend was clearly demonstrated, for example, in the invitation extended to 
President Nicolas Sarkozy of France to deliver the keynote address at the 2009 
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CHOGM held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.8 In this context of such 
new trends in international cooperation, Canada enjoys an especially 
advantageous position, which is reinforced by her simultaneous membership of 
the Commonwealth, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the G8 
and NATO. In strengthening bilateral cooperation across supra-national bodies 
and their priorities in a new era of international cooperation, Canada possesses 
much potential to play a constructive role, which the Harper government has 
been relatively slow to exploit. In sum, Canada’s capabilities within the 
Commonwealth have been side-lined, partly due to the emphasis on the 
“voluntary” nature of the organisation, and partly due to Ottawa’s near-
exclusive emphasis on international trade and influential bilateral partnerships. 
 
Conclusions: Canada and the Commonwealth in an Eastphalian world?  
This article sought to reflect upon Canada’s international role in a 
changing world order, characterised by an easterly shift in world power and 
influence. In an effort to briefly reconstruct the key tenets of Canadian foreign 
policy, its contemporary priorities and options, this article took a diachronic 
approach that evoked the development of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy 
in the post-WWII era, and the evolution of priorities in Ottawa’s international 
agenda. Canada’s domestic and international politics represent a complex web 
of structures, agendas, strategic priorities and historical trajectories, and by no 
means is this article a comprehensive account of present-day Canadian foreign 
policy. Instead, its primary objective involved a glimpse, through the benefit of 
insights into key aspects of the politico-historical evolution of Canadian foreign 
policy, of the challenging prospects for Canada in an emergent Eastphalian 
world order. The Harper government’s neoliberal foreign policy is largely 
characterised by substantive efforts to increase trade partnerships with 
emerging markets. In terms of the Canadian economy, this policy approach 
may indeed be promising, but Canada’s contemporary international standing is 
not limited to economic strength alone. Canada’s legacy of international 
interaction, from the Commonwealth to the UN, NATO and ODA, provides her 
with tremendous potential in international diplomacy, especially with regards to 
the manoeuvring of complex international disputes. In 2012, the British and 
Canadian governments decided to operate a number of foreign diplomatic 
missions in partnership, partly as a cost-cutting initiative (DAVIES 2012). In 
Canada, this measure earned much domestic criticism. This decision followed a 
persuasive speech delivered by British Prime Minister David Cameron at the 
                                                
8 In his speech, Sarkozy strongly highlighted the importance of cooperation between the 
Commonwealth and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (see SARKOZY 2009).  
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Canadian House of Commons on 22 September 2011, calling for increased UK-
Canada cooperation (CAMERON 2011). While such partnerships may certainly 
have a beneficial dimension, Canada today requires a more nuanced appraisal 
of her strengths on the international arena, as an influential member of the 
community of states with a “middle path” international agenda of her own. This 
imperatively involves thinking beyond the ‘foreign policy as international 
trade’ paradigm. It also involves thinking beyond much valued bilateral 
partnerships, including UK-Canada and U.S.-Canada cooperation. Such an 
agenda would enable Canada to reinforce her position on the contemporary 
international scene as an influential middle power. If a lesson were to be 
gleaned from the past, a balanced mixture of the cautious foreign policy 
approach that Prime Minister Mackenzie King envisioned for Canada in the 
mid-decades of the last century, and the energy of Pearsonian internationalism, 
would be of tremendous relevance to Canada’s efforts to consolidate her pleine 




Commonwealth Secretary General, (2011), “Secretary General’s Biennial 
Report, 2011-2013”, London: The Commonwealth Secretariat:  
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/page/documents/SG%20Bienni
al%20Report.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014).  
Government of Canada, (2011), “Baird Appoints Senator Segal as Special 
Envoy for Commonwealth Renewal”: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-
communiques/2011/386.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 29 November 2013).   
Government of Canada, (2012), “A Consolidation of The Constitution Acts, 
1867-1982”, Ottawa: Department of Justice: 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/CONST_E.pdf (accessed 22 November 2013). 
Government of Canada, (2013), “Address by Minister Fast at the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics”, Washington D.C. on 14 March: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/speeches-
discours/2013/03/14a.aspx?lang=eng (Accessed 28 November 2013).  
Government of Canada, (2013), “Canada and the Commonwealth”, last updated 
on October 23, 2013 (accessed 30 November 2013) 
 http://www.international.gc.ca/commonwealth/index.aspx  
Government of Canada, (2013), “Global Markets Action Plan: The Blueprint 
for Creating Jobs and Opportunities for Canadians Through Trade”: 
CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE AT THE HOUR OF EASTPHALIA 
Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 75, 2013 121 
http://international.gc.ca/global-markets-marches-mondiaux/assets/pdfs/plan-
eng.pdf (accessed 29 November 2013). 
House of Commons UK, (2012), “The Role and Future of the Commonwealth”, 
Fourth report of session 2012-13, Foreign Affairs Committee of the British 
House of Commons (accessed 3 January 2014) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114.
pdf  
Office of the Prime Minister, (2013), “Prime Minister Stephen Harper meets 
with President Macky Sall of Senegal”, official website of the Prime Minister 
of Canada: http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/09/25/prime-minister-
stephen-harper-meets-president-macky-sall-senegal (accessed November 29, 
2013). 
Sarkozy, Nicolas, (2009), “Full text of speech delivered at the 2009 CHOGM”, 
London: The Commonwealth Secretariat: 
http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/speech/33247/240789/233699/21670
6/216724/nicolas_sarkozy.htm (accessed 4 January 2014).  
The Commonwealth, (2013), “Commonwealth Strategic Plan 2013/14-
2016/17”, London: The Commonwealth Secretariat: 
http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/document/177370/256196/commonw
ealth_secretariat_strategic_plan_2013_2017.htm (accessed 3 January 2014). 
 
Books and articles 
ABU-LABAN, Yasmeen and NATH, Nisha, (2007), “From Deportation to 
Apology: The Case of Maher Arar and the Canadian State”, Canadian Ethnic 
Studies, 39: 3, 2007, 71-98.  
AMARASINGAM, Amarnath, (2013), “A History of Tamil Diaspora Politics in 
Canada: Organisational Dynamics and Negotiated Order, 1978-2013”, 
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Research Paper No. 11: 
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/A-History-
of-Tamil-Diaspora-Politics-in-Canada_-Organisational-Dynamics-and-
Negotiated-Order-1978-2013-Amarnath-Amarasingam.pdf (accessed 04 
January 2014).   
BUCKNER, Philip, (2008), “The Creation of the Dominion of Canada-1860-
1901”, in Philip Buckner (ed.) Canada and the British Empire. Oxford: OUP. 
66-86.  
________ (ed.) Canada and the British Empire. Oxford: OUP.  
Chaminda K. WEERAWARDHANA 
122 Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 75, 2013 
BÜLLES, Anni-Claudine and KINDORNAY, Shannon, 2013, Beyond Aid: A Plan 
for Canada’s International Cooperation. May 2013, Ottawa: North South 
Institute.  
BURNEY, Derek H. and HAMPSON, Fen Olser, (2012), “How Obama Lost 
Canada: Botching relations with the United States’ biggest trade partner”. 
Foreign Affairs, June 21, 2012: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-
hampson/how-obama-lost-canada (accessed 29 November 2013).  
CARDENAS, Sonia, (2003), “Transgovernmental Activism: Canada's Role in 
Promoting National Human Rights Commissions”, Human Rights Quarterly, 
Volume 25: 3, 775-790.  
CARROLL, Michael K. (2009), Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United 
Nations Emergency Force, 1956–67. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press.  
CHAPNICK, Adam, (2005), The Middle Power Project: Canada and the 
Founding of the United Nations. Vancouver: UBC Press.  
CLÉMENT, Dominique, (2012), ‘Human Rights in Canadian Domestic and 
Foreign Politics: From “Niggardly Acceptance” to Enthusiastic Embrace’, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 34: 3, 751-778.  
DUC, Khanh Vu, (2012), “Canadian Foreign Policy Leaked”. The Asia Sentinel, 
Wednesday 21 November: http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/canadian-
foreign-policy-leaked/ (accessed 26 November 2013).  
ENGLER, Yves, (2012), “Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, 
Global Research, August 15, 2012: http://www.globalresearch.ca/canada-
and-the-north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato/32370 (accessed 3 January 
2014).  
FIDLER, D.P. (2010), “Introduction: Eastphalia emerging? Asia, international 
law and global governance”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 
17, no. 1, pp. 1-12.  
______& GANGULY, S. (2010), “India and Eastphalia”, Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 147-164.  
GINSBURG, Thomas, (2010), “Eastphalia as the perfection of Westphalia”, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 27-45.  
GRANATSTEIN, J. L. (1970), Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: Middle 
Power or Satellite? Toronto: Copp Clark.  
_________. (2013), “Is NATO still necessary for Canada?” Canadian Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Institute, Policy Paper, March 2013: 
CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE AT THE HOUR OF EASTPHALIA 
Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 75, 2013 123 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Is%20NATO%20Still%20Necessary%20for%20C
anada.pdf (Accessed 4 January 2014).  
HART, S. (2008), From Pride to Influence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign 
Policy. Vancouver: UBC Press.  
HYAM, Ronald, (1999), “The primacy of geopolitics: The dynamics of British 
imperial policy, 1763–1963”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 27:2, 27-52.  
KENDLE, John Edward, (1967), The Colonial and Imperial Conferences. 1887-
1911. A Study in Imperial Organization. London: Longman.  
KIM, S.W., Fidler, D.P. & Ganguly, S. (2009), “Eastphalia rising? Asian 
influence and the fate of human security”, World Policy Journal, pp. 53-64.  
KRELING, Beth, (2009), “India and the Commonwealth: A Symbiotic 
Relationship?”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, 98:400, 49-66.  
KUKUCHA, Christopher J., (2008), The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade 
Policy. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.  
LAWLESS, Michael, J. (2006), “Canada and NATO: A starving fish in an 
expanding pond”, Canadian Military Journal, summer 2006, 6-14: 
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no2/lawless-anarchiq-eng.asp (Accessed 
2 January 2014).  
LO, C. (2010), “Values to be added to an "Eastphalian Order" by the emerging 
China”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 13-26.  
MACKENZIE, Hector, (1999), “An old dominion and the new commonwealth: 
Canadian policy on the question of India's membership, 1947–49”, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 27:3, 82-112.  
MACMILLAN, John (1998), On Liberal Peace: Democracy, War and the 
International Order. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.  
MANSERGH, Nicholas, (1953), Documents and Speeches on British 
Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. I. Oxford: OUP.  
MASSIE, Justin, (2008), “North-Atlantic Quadrangle: Mackenzie King’s Lasting 
Imprint on Canada’s International Security Policy”, British Journal of 
Canadian Studies, 24 (2008/9), 85-105.    
MCKENZIE, Francine, (2006), “In the National Interest: Dominions' Support for 
Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War”, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34:4, 553-576.  
MORGENTHAU, Hans J. (1948), Politics among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace. 1st edition, New York: Knopf.  
Chaminda K. WEERAWARDHANA 
124 Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 75, 2013 
NOSSAL, Kim Richard, (1988), “Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada’s Interest in 
Development Assistance. Canadian Journal of Political Science/ Revue 
Candienne de Science Politique, 21: 1, 35-56.  
______ (1997), The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. 3rd edn. 
Scarborough: Prentice Hall.  
ROACH, Kent, (2011), The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism. 
Cambridge: CUP.  
STUTTER, Robert G. (2012), Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and policy 
since the Cold War (third edition). New York: Rowman and Littlefield.   
THOMSON, Dale C., Swanson, Roger, F. (1971), Canadian Foreign Policy: 
Options and Perspectives. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.  
TOUHEY, Ryan M. (2011), “Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker 
Government and the Cold War in South Asia 1957-1963”. The Canadian 
Historical Review, 92: 3, September 2011, 429-454.  
TRIANTIS, S. G. (1971), “Canada’s Interest in Foreign Aid”, World Politics, 
Vol. 24, No. 1 (Oct., 1971), 1-18 
VEATCH, Richard, (1975), Canadian Foreign Policy and the League of Nations, 
1919-1939. Université de Genève, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales, thèse no. 257. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press.  
WHITAKER, Reg, (2010), “How Canada Confronts Terrorism: Canadian 
Responses to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context”, in Kassam, 
Karim-Aly (Ed). Understanding Terror: Perspectives for Canadians. 
Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 37-66.  
 
Media sources 
BADAWI, T.A.A. (2011), “A Commonwealth of the People: Time for Urgent 
Reform”, Document produced by the Eminent Persons’ Group of the 
Commonwealth of Nations. 
http://www.commonwealthministers.com/images/uploads/documents/EPG_9.p
df (accessed 2 January 2014).  
BRADY, Brendan, (2013), “The Empty Chair: Harper boycotts the 
Commonwealth Summit”, The Walrus Magazine, December 2013: 
http://thewalrus.ca/the-empty-chair/ (accessed January 04, 2014).  
CAMERON, David, (2011), “Full transcript of speech delivered at the Canadian 
Parliament on 22 September 2011”, Reproduced by The New Statesman, 23 
September 2011: http://www.newstatesman.com/international-
politics/2011/09/canada-world-canadian-britain (accessed 4 September 2014). 
CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE AT THE HOUR OF EASTPHALIA 
Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 75, 2013 125 
CBC News, (2012), “Canada-China partnership ready for the ‘next level”. Full 
text of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s speech delivered in Guangzhou, 
China, 10 February: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-china-
partnership-ready-for-the-next-level-1.1201854 (accessed 28 November 
2013). 
CBC News, (2012), “Secret document details new Canadian foreign policy”. 
CBC News, 19 November: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/secret-document-
details-new-canadian-foreign-policy-1.1152385 (Accessed 24 November 
2013). 
CBC News, (2012), “Who are honorary Canadian citizens?” CBC News, 8 
March 2012: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/who-are-the-honorary-
canadians-1.1155903 (Accessed 1 January 2014).  
CBC News, (2013), “Harper suggests relocating Sri Lanka Commonwealth 
talks”, 25 April: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/04/25/pol-cp-sri-
lanka-chogm-relocation.html (accessed 19 August 2013). 
CBC News, (2013), “Keystone XL pipeline threatened by U.S. oil boom”, CBC 
News, November 28: http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/keystone-xl-pipeline-
threatened-by-u-s-oil-boom-1.2443923 (Accessed 29 November 2013). 
Clark, Campbell, (2012), “Diplomat warns of Canada's fading chance in 
Africa”, The Globe and Mail, 29, February 2012: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/diplomat-warns-of-canadas-
fading-chance-in-africa/article536171/ (Accessed 2 January 2014).  
Colombo Telegraph, (2013), “UK Listed Sri Lanka as a ‘Country of Concern’ 
but attending the CHOGM is the right thing to do – Cameron”, 12 July: 
http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/uk-listed-sri-lanka-as-a-
country-of-concern-but-attending-the-chogm-is-the-right-thing-to-do-david-
cameron/ (accessed 19 August 2013).  
CTV News, (2011), “Canada looks ‘East’ as Flaherty visits China”, CTV 
News, Monday 14 November: http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada-looks-to-asia-
as-flaherty-visits-china-1.725561 (accessed 29 November 2013). 
CTV News, (2011), “Tory foreign policy review looks east to China”, 
Thursday 17 November: http://www.ctvnews.ca/tory-foreign-policy-review-
looks-east-to-china-1.727572 (accessed 29 November 2013). 
DAVIES, Lizzy, (2012), “UK to share embassy premises with ‘first cousins’ 
Canada”, The Guardian, 24 September 2012: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global/2012/sep/24/diplomacy-embassy-
buildings-uk-canada (Accessed 4 January 2014).  
GAGNON, Lysiane, (2011), “Foreign affairs? Stephen Harper’s smart, but 
cosmopolitan he’s not”, The Globe and Mail, Monday June 20, 2011: 
Chaminda K. WEERAWARDHANA 
126 Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 75, 2013 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/lysiane-gagnon/foreign-
affairs-stephen-harpers-smart-but-cosmopolitan-hes-not/article2065603/ 
(accessed 29 November, 2013). 
GOLDFARB, Danielle, (2013), “Global Intentions: Canada's new Global Markets 
Action Plan sounds the right notes, mostly”. Open Canada, November 27, 
2013: http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/roundtable/global-intentions/ 
(accessed 29 November 2013).  
GOTLIEB, Allan, (1991). “The United States in Canadian Foreign Policy”. Text 
of the O. D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Toronto: December 10, 1991: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/department/skelton_clf1/PDF/skelton-gottlieb-
en.pdf (Accessed 2 January 2013).   
Hornsby, David. (2013), “Turning Perception into Reality: Canada in Africa”, 
Open Canada, November 7, 2013: http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-
tank/essays/turning-perception-into-reality-canada-in-africa/ (Accessed 2 
January 2014).  
Huffington Post, (2011), “Canadian Trade: Tories look East to China in Foreign 
Policy review”. Huffington Post Canada, November 16: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/11/16/canadian-trade-harper-
government_n_1098159.html (accessed 29 November, 2013). 
PARIS, Roland, (2012), “Whither Canada-US relations?” Canadian International 
Council, 29 June: http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/roundtable/whither-
canada-u-s-relations/ (accessed 24 November 2013).  
_______, (2013), “CIDA merger is fine, but fundamental questions of policy 
remain unresolved”, The Globe and Mail, March 22: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/cida-merger-is-fine-but-
fundamental-questions-of-policy-remain-unresolved/article10164789/ 
(accessed 30 November 2013). 
PEARSON, Glen, (2011), “The Scramble for Africa... Again”. Huffington Post 
(Canada edition), June 22, 2011: http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/glen-
pearson/stephen-harper-africa_b_882680.html.  
SAIDEMAN, Steve, (2012), “Canada and NATO, NATO and Canada”, Canadian 
International Council (Open Canada), 20 May 2012: 
http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/roundtable/canada-and-nato-nato-and-
canada/ (accessed 3 January 2014).  
SIDDIQUI, Haroon, (2012), “Prime Minister Harper’s Foreign Policy Hobbled 
by Ideology”, The Toronto Star, October 13, 2012: 
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/10/13/prime_minister_
harpers_foreign_policy_hobbled_by_ideology.html (accessed 2 January 
2014).  
CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE AT THE HOUR OF EASTPHALIA 
Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 75, 2013 127 
The National Post, (2013), “Graphic: Follow the aid money to Canada’s 
‘countries of focus”, 11 January: 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/01/11/graphic-follow-the-aid-money-to-
canadas-countries-of-focus/ (Accessed 29 November 2013). 
The Star, (2013), “Canada should attend Commonwealth meeting in Sri Lanka: 
Chapnick”, 13 August: 
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/08/13/canada_should_atte
nd_commonwealth_meeting_in_sri_lanka_chapnick.html (accessed 19 
August 2013).   
YORK, Geoffrey, (2013), “Canada’s African aid marred by organizational 
turmoil, changing priorities”. The Globe and Mail, March 22, 2013: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadas-african-aid-marred-
by-organizational-turmoil-changing-priorities/article10254420/ (accessed 29 
November 2013). 
________, (2009), “Focus: Banned Aid”, The Globe and Mail, Friday, May 29: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/munk-debates/banned-
aid/article4261160/ (Accessed 29 November 2013). 
 
